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Description
Classification / scope
Research / security preflight / P2 — feasibility only, NOT a request to embed a second security scanner in 007.
Question: before o7 run lets a coding agent interact with a new/untrusted repository, can a lightweight, static-only intake step identify repository-controlled execution surfaces and stop the run from silently crossing the trust boundary?
Why here: 007's README documents a disposable git worktree and autonomous agent execution with a deny-list; a worktree isolates changes to tracked files, not credentials, network egress, host processes or malicious tool instructions. Generic VM/sandbox discussions alone do not inventory what the repo is asking the agent/toolchain to execute.
Scope separation:
- #74: universal change admission / proof-carrying change, broader architecture.
- #53: external sidecar + sandbox process boundary.
- #44: 007 should invoke evidence adapters, not own supply-chain detection logic.
- ScenarioBox (concept only; no verified project repository) is a possible future caller of the same independent intake adapter for one-click manual test environments; this issue does not authorize building ScenarioBox or stretching 007 into a VM product.
Real-world motivation and evidence
- tayvano/lazarus-bluenoroff-research aggregates incident reports and examples of malicious developer projects; specifically VS Code task cases and fake job coding tests.
- VS Code Workspace Trust disables automatic task execution in Restricted Mode, but this is an IDE boundary, not a protection offered by Git worktrees or by generic CLI agents.
- The tayvano repository also contains live malicious sample archives. Do not clone/sample-execute them for this experiment, fetch them via a tool-enabled agent, or put them in the 007 repo/CI. Use public textual incident descriptions to derive harmless inert fixtures only; attribution to DPRK is not assumed for every report.
Candidate preflight threat model
A repo can be readable but dangerous to build, install, run, trust in an IDE or grant to an agent. Candidate execution surfaces to inventory (not exhaustive):
.vscode/tasks.jsonauto-run (runOn: folderOpen), debug/launch configurations and IDE extension recommendations.package.jsonlifecycle scripts (preinstall/install/postinstall, etc.) and transitive package scripts;npm ciis not a read-only operation.- Python build backends/legacy
setup.py, Makefile/npm scripts;dotnetMSBuild custom tasks/targets; CI/actions/workflows and custom runner hooks. - Shell command chains, network downloads piped to interpreters, secrets/SSH/cloud-credentials access, filesystem writes, persistence and process spawning.
- Repo-owned
AGENTS.md/agent settings/prompts or MCP/tool manifests that might trick an autonomous agent into treating untrusted instructions as authority. - Opaque/transitive execution and unsupported languages must produce
UNKNOWN, not a claim that the repo is safe.
Critical distinction: this is a static, opt-in risk inventory. A warning is not evidence that a project is malicious; lack of a warning is not proof of harmlessness. No automatic execution during inspection.
Gate 0: overlap and baseline before implementation
- Inspect the exact current 007 run setup, existing permission/sandbox boundaries and extension/gate APIs; distinguish stated design from enforced restrictions.
- Compare at least DataDog/guarddog, safedep/vet, and existing repository-intake scanners (e.g. preflight) on their actual supported inputs. Package scanners are not automatically complete repository/IDE/agent scanners.
- Choose whether the right home is an external read-only adapter called before agent launch, an OwnAudit profile, or a ScenarioBox security hook. Do not introduce a new scanner library into 007 if an existing check suffices.
- Predeclare STOP/GO thresholds and legal access constraints. No network scanning or reputation claims beyond permitted public evidence.
Minimal reproducible spike (safe fixtures only)
- Prepare 6–10 inert, hand-audited fixtures covering: malicious-looking autostart (inert command), legitimate task, package install hook, nested/transitive configuration, agent-instruction injection as data, network/effect chaining, missing/unsupported config.
- Source linkage: case type → public textual incident report → synthetic fixture → expected execution path → scan report.
- Detect entry point → trigger → command/tool → potential effect (host filesystem/network/credential read), including whether executing it requires explicit user trust/approval.
- Use
Risk / Needs review / Not observed / Unknownwith evidence anchors and completeness limits. Never emitSAFEfor missing coverage. - Compare the adapter with baseline(s) for unique true detections, false positives, missing coverage, scan time and analyst effort; preserve negatives and unverifiable cases.
- If justified, integrate via an explicit pre-run optional gate with
STOP/DEFERwhen inspection cannot complete, independent of agent output. Do not make it mandatory until compatibility and fail-closed semantics are proven. Agent must not override preflight verdict.
Decision / deliverables
- Current 007 execution-trust boundary diagram backed by code + exact SHA.
- Comparison / dedup matrix with existing scanners, OwnAudit/007 tasks and VS Code Workspace Trust.
- Harmless fixtures + independently reviewed expectations + false-positive/UNKNOWN cases; no raw malware samples.
- Example portable, tool-independent execution-risk graph and machine-readable report, annotated with uncertainty.
- Decision
REUSE-EXTERNAL / ADAPT-ADAPTER / STOP-NO-GAP, bounded cost, owner repo for a follow-up (if any). - No full scanner, mandatory gate, shell execution, container download, VM automation, access to secret-bearing environments, PR or deployment as part of this issue.
Hard guardrail: a fork/worktree, running inside WSL2, or asking an LLM whether a repository is safe are not sufficient security boundaries.
Activity
PhysShell commentedon Nov 20, 2026
Raven donor: malicious Windows installer and compatibility-layer attack surface (20.11.2026)
Research page · Raven README.
Raven runs Windows installers and emulates NT/Win32 services under a constrained Linux prefix. This offers a distinct negative-fixture family for untrusted repository / installer preflight, but Raven's project age (created October 2026) and README claims are not independent security evidence.
Bounded extension of existing #156 only if Windows payloads are in scope: static inspection and isolated execution of a synthetic EXE/MSI that attempts host path traversal, registry persistence, command-line host path abuse, privilege/elevation claims, symlink swap, network egress and child-process escape. Use a disposable VM; monitor host syscalls/files outside guest, compare with known policy and independent hash oracle. Do not use live malware or expose genuine credentials.
Separate RAVEN-01 / WPF-COMPATIBILITY / DEFERRED: compare a frozen .NET Framework 4.7.2 + DevExpress v12.2 smoke app on Raven, Wine and Windows VM. Upstream claims .NET Framework 4.8/WPF but does not demonstrate this enterprise stack; do not infer production readiness from launching Notepad++ or .NET demos. If no Windows-guest scenario is relevant to #156, leave this research archived on the page instead of expanding preflight scope. No new tooling requirement or production dependency.
PhysShell commentedon Nov 21, 2026
Research addendum (21.11.2026): Atomdrift Scan as another candidate preflight signal
Full source-backed page · atomdrift-project/scan · cleave · azoth
Placement: this is supporting prior art for the existing comparison in #156, not an authorization to integrate a scanner into 007 or start a new preflight framework. The question remains whether an external, read-only analyzer adds meaningful evidence about repo-controlled execution surfaces before the agent executes anything.
Verified characteristics
benign / suspicious / hostile. It claims support for npm, Go modules, NuGet, GitHub Actions, VSIX, scripts, PE and many other formats.0 clean / 1 hostile / 2 suspicious / 3 error / 4 incomplete ruleset / 130 interrupted.4is not a negative security finding: rules may have failed to load.allow / block / unanalyzed / unavailableand exposes hash, engine version, findings and decision source. A known-hash allow can bypass deep analysis; preserve origin and coverage.--followcan fetch dependencies and code references. Updates and release checks can also use the network. For hermetic inspection require pinned binary/rules,--no-update,--follow=none,SCAN_NO_UPDATE_CHECK=1,SCAN_NO_UPLOAD=1, and an independent network-deny boundary. Do not pass private repo or credentials to remote LLMs/Uplink.Fit to #156 / kill-first
benignnever upgrades an unknown/uninspected execution path to SAFE. Differentiate potential capability from reachabletrigger → command → effect.Cross-reference: OwnAudit #45 owns evidence adapters; STS #30 is a different runtime threat-detection topic. 007 remains PARKED; no execution, dependency install, CI gate, production edit or PR is authorized by this comment.