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Description
Context
While looking at aula-id/koma's extension protocol, one useful idea stands out: extensions are not loaded into the host process. They are supervised sidecar processes with a manifest, a duplex protocol, and explicit grants.
Koma's Unix implementation currently looks roughly like this:
host creates local socket
host launches extension process
extension receives socket path + token through env
extension sends Hello { protocol, token, manifest }
host replies Welcome
then both sides exchange Invoke / Call / Result / Event frames
The important shape is not the Unix socket itself. The useful shape is:
manifest-declared contributions
+ grant-declared requirements
+ host-enforced permission checks
+ external supervised process
+ machine-readable protocol
For 007, this maps naturally to the existing run/gate/judge direction, but with a stronger process boundary than Koma's first-party trust model.
Thesis
007 should eventually support extension sidecars, but not as a product-store/plugin-marketplace feature.
The useful form for 007 is:
extension sidecar
+ host grants
+ TaskContract / DiffPolicy
+ Sandboy-backed process confinement
+ run-record evidence
Protocol grants answer:
What may this extension ask 007 to do?
Sandboy answers:
What may this extension process do to the host?
Both are needed. Grants without a process boundary are only polite paperwork if the extension process can still read host secrets, env vars, sockets, SSH agents, NuGet tokens, or arbitrary filesystem paths.
Proposed extension classes
Initial extension kinds should be boring and harness-focused:
gate-provider
judge-provider
sandbox-provider
reporter
workflow-provider
policy-provider
Example directions:
sandboy extension:
contributes.sandbox_backends = ["landlock-seccomp"]
requires = []
ownaudit extension:
contributes.judges = ["fp-triage", "lifetime-leak"]
requires = ["runs:read", "models:invoke"]
ownnet extension:
contributes.gates = ["roslyn-analyzer-tests", "wpf-smoke"]
requires = ["runs:read"]
Non-goal for now:
TUI extensions
store/account/payment UX
open marketplace
web panels
OAuth provider ecosystem
Those are product features. 007 needs execution evidence first, not a plugin mall with better fonts.
Transport model
Keep the protocol transport-agnostic.
Linux/macOS:
KOMA-style Unix socket
Windows:
Named Pipe, e.g. \\.\pipe\o7-ext-<id>-<nonce>
Avoid loopback TCP unless there is a good reason. Named Pipes give local IPC, ACLs, and avoid turning extension IPC into yet another localhost/firewall incident report.
The envelope can stay conceptually identical across transports:
ExtMsg:
Hello
Call
Result
Health
Notify
HostMsg:
Welcome
Reject
Invoke
Result
Ping
Shutdown
Event
The host owns grants, dispatch, pending calls, timeout, lifecycle, and run-record persistence.
Sandboy integration
Every extension process should be launched through a Sandboy backend when a policy is attached.
o7 host
reads extension manifest
resolves grants
resolves process policy
launches extension through sandboy backend
records sandbox report
accepts protocol handshake only after launch boundary is established
Expected run-record artifacts:
runs/<target>/<run-id>/extensions/<extension-id>/
manifest.normalized.json
grants.json
sandbox.json
stdout.log
stderr.log
For gate steps, reuse the same policy/report model already planned for GateStep.sandbox_policy:
[[gate]]
name = "windows-roslyn-tests"
cmd = "pwsh -File ./build/test-roslyn.ps1"
env = "windows"
timeout_sec = 600
sandbox_policy = "windows-worktree-no-secrets"Windows backend shape
Current Sandboy is Linux-first: Landlock + seccomp. That should remain the Linux backend.
For Windows, do not try to "port Landlock". Use a separate backend behind the same policy/report contract:
sandboy-linux:
Landlock + seccomp
sandboy-windows:
Job Object
Restricted Token
Low Integrity / AppContainer-ish profile where feasible
DACL-scoped worktree/temp dirs
environment allowlist
timeout / process-tree kill
best-effort or explicit network status
The Windows backend must report what it actually enforced:
{
"backend": "windows-job-restricted-token",
"filesystem": "partial",
"network": "not_enforced",
"process_tree": "enforced",
"env": "enforced",
"timeout": "enforced"
}Avoid boolean secure: true. That field is how software lies to itself before a breach report.
Acceptance criteria for a first slice
A realistic first slice does not need the whole extension system.
- Define protocol/manifest sketch in docs.
- Add explicit note that extensions are out-of-process sidecars, not in-process plugins.
- Define grants vs process sandbox as separate layers.
- Define Windows transport target as Named Pipes, not Unix socket.
- Define run-record artifacts for extension lifecycle.
- Keep implementation blocked behind existing Phase 1 work:
TaskContractDiffPolicyGateStep.timeout_secGateStep.sandbox_policysandboy run --report <json>
Proposed order
Phase 1:
GateStep.sandbox_policy + timeout_sec
sandboy run --report
Linux gate wrapping
Phase 2:
Windows sandboy backend design note
Named Pipe transport note
extension manifest/grants sketch
Phase 3:
one sidecar extension prototype, likely reporter or judge-provider
Phase 4:
sandboxed extension launch with run-record evidence
Why this belongs in 007
Koma's extension protocol is interesting because it treats extension integration as a supervised protocol boundary.
007 can do better for its niche by adding the missing execution boundary:
Koma-style sidecar protocol
+ 007-style task/run/gate/judge records
+ Sandboy process confinement
+ machine-readable evidence
That would keep 007 small while allowing Own.NET, OwnAudit, Sandboy, and future project-specific tooling to plug in without turning the core binary into a drawer full of special cases.
Activity
PhysShell commentedon Nov 20, 2026
Golem donor: host-enforced capability attenuation for tool sidecars (20.11.2026)
Research page · Golem permissions documentation.
GOLEM-02 / CAPABILITY-ATTENUATION / KILL-FIRST as a potential test donor for this existing sidecar/host-grant boundary. Golem permission cards specify resource/recipient/operation/target, narrow derivation, revocation and upper-bound denials; host checks every tool/file/network/secret operation. Critical caveat: if no explicit initialCard, broad default permissions are assigned; presence of capability system does NOT imply least privilege default. Untrusted repo instructions must never upgrade sidecar authority.
Negative tests: delegated card attempts to broaden parent, revoked/expired grants, unauthorized network host, workspace traversal/delete, secret handle vs reveal, unexpected tool invocation, prior revision/card during replay; check host denial and security receipt independently of model prompt. Observe approval handling for irreversible operations. A Go/OS sandbox with owner-scoped checks may suffice; do not copy card-wallet infrastructure unless it demonstrably closes a confirmed existing gap.
GO only with independently reproduced bypass or materially simpler enforcement; NO-GO if existing Sandboy process boundary and explicit host grants cover same threat model. No new runtime dependency; Golem source server BUSL-1.1.
PhysShell commentedon Nov 20, 2026
Raven donor: sandboxed Windows prefix, per-app layers and explicit file grants (20.11.2026)
Research page · upstream · source tree · licenses.
RAVEN-02 / PREFIX-ISOLATION / KILL-FIRST as a test donor for existing Sandboy sidecars/host grants, not a proposal to embed a Win32 runtime. Raven README documents per-prefix Windows C:/registry, snapshot before installer, per-application private layer for changes to foreign locations, explicit host file grants via file picker, denied sandbox.log and optional Linux Landlock. Source tree includes sandbox/confine/snapshot implementations and tests; no independent isolation certification.
Run an isolated synthetic malicious guest + external Linux oracle: (1) app-owned vs foreign file writes and shared registry keys, (2) snapshot/restore and concurrent app state, (3) symlink/path traversal, TOCTOU rename after permission grant, (4) inherited file descriptors and child process, (5) host helper/file picker scope, (6) denied network access. Record before/after hash of host and prefix, actual observable side effects vs policy and log, exact SHA, kernel version and Landlock capability. Compare with existing namespace/overlayfs/Landlock and Sandboy baseline.
GO: independently reproduce an actionable isolation failure or a simpler enforceable host-grant model. NO-GO: existing sandbox already covers threat model or Raven's app-layer complexity introduces unverified paths. No product runtime adoption or new CI; Linux host runtime GPL-3.0-or-later, guest adapters have separate licenses.