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Description
Classification
- Change type: enhancement / deferred evidence adapters + research lab
- Priority: P2
- Expected value: medium-high after slice 1 proves the evidence/profile architecture
- Implementation risk: high if started too early — can easily turn into a broad supply-chain scanner or unreliable rebuild farm
- Repository owner: OwnAudit implementation/research layer
- Depends on: OwnAudit Supply evidence slice 1: SourceLink/PDB and NuGet resolution-policy adapters #44 and
PhysShell/Own.NET#271 - Production status: deferred; do not start before the SourceLink/PDB + NuGet policy slice is stable
Problem
There are many useful supply-chain tools, but OwnAudit should not duplicate them:
NuGet Audit / OSV-Scanner / Grype -> known vulnerability evidence
Syft -> SBOM evidence
OpenSSF Scorecard -> repository posture evidence
SLSA / GitHub artifact attestations / Sigstore -> build/provenance evidence
rebuild experiments -> selected source-to-artifact correspondence evidence
The gap worth owning is not "another scanner". The gap is a .NET/NuGet/legacy-enterprise evidence aggregator that can combine those signals with SourceLink/PDB metadata, package policy and existing audit findings.
Goal
After the first supply evidence slice is stable, add optional adapters for mature tools and a separate selected rebuild lab.
The adapters must remain independent modules feeding the same evidence contract. They must not add a second report pipeline or replace existing tools.
Proposed later adapters
known-vuln
Inputs:
packages.lock.json
project.assets.json
NuGet package graph
OSV-Scanner output
NuGet Audit output
Grype output where SBOM exists
Rules:
SC007 VulnerablePackage
Non-goal: OwnAudit does not maintain a vulnerability database.
sbom
Use Syft or another external SBOM generator. OwnAudit consumes the result as evidence.
Questions to answer:
what packages are inside this artifact?
which transitive dependencies exist?
which binaries/native blobs are present?
which packages lack source/provenance metadata?
Non-goal: OwnAudit does not invent an SBOM format.
repo-posture
Use OpenSSF Scorecard or equivalent repo-health tooling for dependency source repositories.
Signals:
branch protection
pinned dependencies
binary artifacts
signed releases
security policy
maintained/stale status
This is repository posture evidence, not package proof. A good Scorecard result does not prove that a .nupkg matches a source commit.
attestations
Consume available build provenance evidence:
SLSA provenance
GitHub artifact attestations
Sigstore/cosign where applicable
in-toto/DSSE-style attestations
Non-goal: no local trust policy engine yet unless the evidence contract proves it is needed.
rebuild-lab
Selected source-to-artifact correspondence experiments only.
Candidate targets:
Internal.*
Sector.*
high-risk dependencies
packages with native binaries
packages touched by an incident
packages with missing/contradictory provenance evidence
Rules:
SC013 ArtifactNotReproducible
SC014 NupkgContainsUnexpectedBinary
SC015 PackageBuiltFromDirtyOrUnknownSource
SC020 RebuildAttempted
SC021 DeterministicRebuildMismatch
SC022 NormalizedDllMismatch
SC023 NupkgContentMismatch
This must not attempt to rebuild the NuGet ecosystem.
Profiles
Add only as opt-in profiles:
incident-response:
enabled:
- nuget-integrity
- known-vuln
- sbom
- repo-posture
- attestations
- rebuild-lab
rebuild-lab:
enabled:
- rebuild-lab
packages:
- "Internal.*"
- "Sector.*"No CI default profile should run rebuilds.
Nix/dev environment
Prefer multiple dev shells/packages instead of a monster shell:
devShells.supply-light # Python + dotnet + jq + git
devShells.supply-full # supply-light + OSV/Syft/Grype/Scorecard if packaged
devShells.rebuild-lab # heavier source checkout/build experiments
Nix pins Linux-native tooling. It must not pretend to solve Windows/DevExpress 12.2 build constraints.
Non-goals
- No replacement for NuGet Audit, OSV-Scanner, Syft, Grype, Scorecard, SLSA, Sigstore or GitHub attestations.
- No universal package trust verdict.
- No broad ecosystem rebuild.
- No required 007 gate.
- No learned risk model.
- No GUAC-like graph database in this issue.
Required controls
- Each adapter can be disabled without affecting others.
- Missing adapter/tool is reported as coverage limitation, not a clean result.
- Scorecard/posture evidence cannot prove package source correspondence.
- Attestation evidence cannot prove byte-for-byte reproducibility unless linked to rebuild evidence.
- Rebuild failures are classified: environment failure, restore failure, build mismatch, normalized binary mismatch, nupkg content mismatch.
- Rebuild scope is explicit and selected; no accidental broad sweep.
- No adapter performs policy decisions directly; policy evaluation remains separate.
Acceptance
- Adapter design note exists for
known-vuln,sbom,repo-posture,attestations, andrebuild-lab. - Profiles keep later slices disabled by default.
- At least one external-tool adapter is fixture-tested without network access.
-
rebuild-labhas a dry-run/plan mode before any real build execution. - Reports clearly separate integrity, provenance, repository posture, source correspondence and reproducibility.
- No issue in this track blocks the first SourceLink/PDB + NuGet policy slice.
Activity
PhysShell commentedon Nov 21, 2026
Research reference (21.11.2026): Atomdrift Scan malicious-capability evidence
Detailed Page · Scan · cleave diff · integration & exit contract
Place only as a candidate external adapter in the deferred supply-evidence track. Its output concerns static indicators of malicious behavior in package/release bytes (including NuGet, Go, PE/DLL, scripts, VSIX, CI actions), not known-vulnerability evidence, SBOM, SourceLink/PDB provenance, SLSA attestation or reproducible build verification. A separate ML verdict must not silently become the OwnAudit authority to block or approve.
Transferable contracts:
allow / block / unanalyzed / unavailable, plus scanner exit0 / 1 / 2 / 3 / 4(4means incomplete rule set, never clean). Missing rules, skipped archive members or unsupported formats must be explicit coverage limitations, not successful absence-of-risk evidence.cleave diffas a narrow signal of changed potential capabilities from a previous pinned package revision. Capability != proven execution path and suspicious != malicious.Only after the first slice: a bounded offline fixture comparison against current OwnAudit baseline, GuardDog and SafeDep on identical supported inputs. Record incremental verified findings, false positives, unknowns, processing cost and value of version-to-version diff. GO-NARROW only for independently demonstrated value; otherwise retain evidence/status ideas without runtime adoption.
This comment does not expand the issue's existing deferred sequence or authorize installation, vendor service, CI policy, real client artifacts, malware execution, uploads or implementation. 007 #156 owns preflight execution-risk inventory.