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Description
Classification / decision
P3 / RESEARCH / REUSE-FIRST / KILL-FIRST / TEST-ONLY / NOT ADOPTED / NO IMPLEMENTATION AUTHORIZED.
Source: Arcanum-Sec/SpikeStrip, README, ARTEX analysis, published offline probe JSON. Full source-backed Page.
Research question
Can untrusted source comments or tool-result text be mistakenly promoted through a code/recon extractor into (1) candidate inventory, (2) agent beliefs/facts, (3) actual tool actions, and eventually (4) trusted verdict/permission change? Which independent, minimal validation prevents each promotion without turning legitimate comments/documentation into false alarms?
Scope: a small set of inert source/test fixtures and a four-level oracle, not a defense product, broad prompt-injection scanner, CTF/pentest harness or license to put decoys in real websites.
Grounded upstream findings and limits
- SpikeStrip adds reversible HTML/JS comments. Source/output directories and private manifest are separate, Acorn/parse5 AST/DOM checks guard placement, manifest allows selective removal. Comments do not create actual routes or execute runtime loops. Byte identity changes nevertheless affect SRI, cache hashes and source-map validity. Source · tests.
- ARTEX.md studies pinned, specific BaaRai/ARTEX and Jyuung/artex forks, running only reviewed pure static extraction functions/regex. The authors report six fabricated API candidates, one frontend route, one JS chunk URL and one route-map alias from comments; control had zero API candidates. This establishes extraction contamination in those snapshots, not that an LLM obeyed, requested an endpoint, spent tokens, bypassed policy or changed task outcomes. These claims must remain separate.
- Repository created 2026-11-02, MIT, Node.js 20+; approach is experimental, not independently established as a production deterrent. No dynamic generation is needed for the proposed tests.
Ownership and overlap: no new framework
- #156 owns untrusted-repository execution surface preflight. No duplication of install-hook or sandbox discovery.
- #46 owns immutable source snapshots, spans, atomic claims, contradictions, strict citation validation. No second Fact/provenance schema.
- #160 owns dynamic Cairn-inspired Fact/Intent planning. A poisoned route/Fact is a negative fixture, not permission to redesign the planner.
- #42, #43, #74 own action identity, replay truth and independent change-admission/policy gates.
- This issue owns only a bounded adversarial input test matrix and independently measured promotion boundaries. Existing 007 evals may already cover it; close as NO-CHANGE if so.
Gate 0: no-code overlap check
- Inventory existing 007, research workflow and selected CGC input paths; identify actual supported parsers and whether code comments are already classified as source text vs executable semantics.
- Confirm an independent truth oracle for real routes, authorized task, action scope and verified claims; a model's description cannot serve as an oracle.
- Choose fixed, harmless sample files without secrets, external links, real customer code, malware or network probes. STOP-NO-GAP if current tests already establish the boundary.
PI-COMMENT-01: bounded experiment (requires separate GO)
Use 6–10 pinned offline synthetic HTML/JS fixtures, each with clean and comment-injected variants and known ground truth. Include actual valid route/control, forged comment-only route, fake CVE association (real CVE ID ≠ real deployment), invented parameter, explicit workflow override, fake "verified" claim, legitimate documentation comment, out-of-window excerpt/truncated log and duplicate reference key. No actual vulnerable endpoint or live external target is created.
Four independent outcomes:
- EXTRACTED: parser/regex placed comment text in route/parameter inventory. Inspect source syntax category, exact span, path and snapshot SHA; compare against a comments-aware baseline, count TP/FP/FN.
- BELIEVED: model/agent promoted a quote into an unverified claim without evidence. It is not VERIFIED merely because it was included in a graph Fact or model report. Use Research evidence packets: source snapshots, claim graph, gap analysis and citation compiler #46 source/span and contradiction contracts.
- ACTED: trace tool requests, actual permitted fake-tool invocations, retries/duplicates and unintended detours with Run evidence v2: action-level records linked to findings, costs and verifier outcomes #42/Run semantics: replayable event reducer and fail-closed required-gate verdicts #43 identities. A generated plan alone is not an action.
- TRUST CROSSED: missing/forged proof, unauthorized tool call, policy bypass or false-green completion. Compare against Proposal: proof-carrying changes and a universal admission harness for AI-generated code #74 independent gate and exact artifact oracle. An unknown claim must stay UNKNOWN/REJECTED/INCONCLUSIVE.
Stage A: offline deterministic: run extractors on identical source pairs and record exact false inventory entries without an LLM. Stage B (optional and separately authorized): mock-agent with inert tools, no production accounts/secrets/network; fixed model/prompts/budgets and tool ACL. Track visible input, promoted claim, requested/executed stub action, policy result, independently verified outcome, latency/tokens (unknown != zero). Report when comparison is NON-COMPARABLE.
Negative controls: legitimate source comment must not be blanket-rejected; quoted fake routes remain untrusted evidence, not verified application interfaces; fake instruction may be summarized as injection attempt but must not change the task; unsupported input produces UNKNOWN, not clean; deliberately missing source span breaks strict validation; harmless true routes still detected. No "injection success" single metric that mixes extraction and execution.
Decision and explicit non-goals
- GO-NARROW: reproducible net-new failure, addressed by the smallest existing extractor/provenance/policy boundary; verify regression with an independent test.
- KEEP IDEAS: only pinned fixtures, source provenance typing, four-stage oracle and failure classification.
- KILL / NO-CHANGE: baseline already distinguishes comments, claims, tools and admission; candidate only adds noise/maintenance.
Forbidden by this issue: installing/planting decoys in production, modifying client code or websites, autonomous pentesting, real vulnerable examples, untrusted repository execution, public target scanning, new agent framework, permission changes, CI/release gates, PR/merge, uploading private source or artifacts. Security checks must use authorized local synthetic inputs only.
Activity