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Release 2018.4.3 forthcoming #14907

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@Hainish

Type: other

cc @jsha @pde @J0WI @diracdeltas @jeremyn @gloomy-ghost @Bisaloo

I plan on making this the release that incorporates the sign-rulesets branch.

Activity

  1. jeremyn commented on Mar 14, 2018

    @jeremyn
    Contributor

    Where can I download an example of an intermediate ruleset update, if that's active yet?

  2. Hainish commented on Mar 14, 2018

    @Hainish
    MemberAuthor

    @jeremyn sign-rulesets only has full ruleset delivery. I'd love to get a functioning branch for intermediate updates in the near future. I don't see why we couldn't gracefully move to intermediate updates, so I'm leaving that for a later iteration.

  3. jeremyn commented on Mar 15, 2018

    @jeremyn
    Contributor

    By intermediate ruleset delivery I mean that it downloads rulesets, whether all 20k+ or just what's changed, from some EFF URL. In other words "intermediate" meaning "between full extension releases", not "intermediate" meaning "less than the full number of rulesets", in case that wasn't clear.

  4. Hainish commented on Mar 15, 2018

    @Hainish
    MemberAuthor

    @jeremyn I don't have this available just yet, but I should have the actual URL we'll be using within the extension available in the next few days.

  5. jeremyn commented on Mar 16, 2018

    @jeremyn
    Contributor

    @Hainish So we're on the same page: my understanding of sign-rulesets is that it downloads a ruleset collection from some URL, say https://eff.org/rulesets.zip , confirms its integrity somehow, and then replaces/updates the existing set of rulesets with what's in the collection.

    I'm interested in downloading rulesets.zip manually and taking a look at it, and I asked you for the URL for it, and you said you're going to create one.

    Is that right? If so, how have you been testing so far? An internal/local server?

  6. Hainish commented on Mar 16, 2018

    @Hainish
    MemberAuthor

    @jeremyn yes, that's all correct (though it's not a zip file). I've been signing the rulesets via utils/sign-rulesets-standalone.sh and serving the generated ruleset files via python -m SimpleHTTPServer, modifying chromium/background-scripts/update_channels.js to the appropriate local values.

  7. J0WI commented on Mar 16, 2018

    @J0WI
    Contributor

    How will this work in the Tor browser? They don't allow any connection like this.

  8. Hainish commented on Mar 16, 2018

    @Hainish
    MemberAuthor

    @J0WI the Tor Browser transparently proxies any connections made from extensions. The downloads will go over Tor. You're not able to test this with a localhost connection, however. You have to post the rulesets on a publicly accessible endpoint.

  9. J0WI commented on Mar 17, 2018

    @J0WI
    Contributor

    It's not a technical limitation, it's a design decision by the Tor Project.
    Add-On updates, Safe search, telemetry etc. are all disabled.

  10. changed the title [-]Release 2018.3.27 forthcoming[/-] [+]Release 2018.4.2 forthcoming[/+] on Mar 19, 2018
  11. Hainish commented on Mar 19, 2018

    @Hainish
    MemberAuthor

    @J0WI add-ons have always been able to be updated from within Tor Browser. Can you link me to a specific design document specification where this is blocked?

  12. Hainish commented on Mar 19, 2018

    @Hainish
    MemberAuthor

    I've changed the estimated release date to 2018.4.2 to give enough lead-up time to coordinate with our press team at EFF.

  13. J0WI commented on Mar 19, 2018

    @J0WI
    Contributor

    @Hainish it's hard to find this again, but I think https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10394 is the right one.
    First attempt to disable updates was here but this has been reverted due a regression.

  14. Hainish commented on Mar 19, 2018

    @Hainish
    MemberAuthor

    @J0WI this is for updates to the extension itself, rather than the rulesets. A lot of the motivation for pinning the version comes from a lack of trust in the AMO updates process, see https://hackernoon.com/postmortem-of-the-firefox-and-tor-certificate-pinning-vulnerability-rabbit-hole-bd507c1403b4. Delivery of rulesets out-of-band from the extension itself makes it so that if the Tor Browser pins the version of the extension, as it looks like they might do, users will still have a recent version of the rulesets. The ruleset updates would not be blocked by Tor Browser.

  15. 20 remaining items

  16. J0WI commented on Mar 23, 2018

    @J0WI
    Contributor

    Regarding HPKP, Chrome is planning on deprecating and removing it

    I think Tor have different priorities... Also Mozilla itself didn't announced to drop this feature too, but they started to support it on their own services.

  17. jeremyn commented on Mar 23, 2018

    @jeremyn
    Contributor

    I think that the rule should be that the sign-rulesets updates should be at least as secure as however users download the full extension. So if AMO or the Tor Project uses HPKP, then the sign-rulesets updates should too. At least, the burden of argument for using HPKP shouldn't fall on @J0WI or anyone else asking for HPKP.

    So, I agree with @J0WI here.

  18. Hainish commented on Mar 24, 2018

    @Hainish
    MemberAuthor

    I've prevented the downgrade attack scenario in fcf9f10:

    Protect against downgrade attacks. A sophisticated attacker would
    previously be able to switch default.rulesets.gz with an old signed
    ruleset file. We now combine the fact that the JavaScript checks that
    latest-rulesets-timestamp has a greater value than what is currently
    stored and, vitally, that it matches the timestamp bundled with the
    signed ruleset file.

    I've added timestamped filenames with this as well. I'd like to keep our schema simple. The advantage of having a latest-rulesets-timestamp file as the heartbeat is that it's a very small file. With 2M+ weekly chrome users and close to a million daily Firefox users (plus who knows how many Tor Browser users) I'd like to keep the bandwidth strain low when we have no new updates.

  19. jeremyn commented on Mar 24, 2018

    @jeremyn
    Contributor

    @Hainish I'm not sure if your "small file" comment was against my instructions.json recommendation, but if so:

    Assume we have three million daily users and are comparing

    latest-rulesets-timestamp (11 bytes): 1234567890

    with

    instructions.json (about 200 bytes):

    {
    	"timestamp": 1234567890,
    	"url": "https://www.https-rulesets.org/v1/default.rulesets.1234567890.gz",
    	"signature": "https://www.https-rulesets.org/v1/rulesets-signature.1234567890.sha256"
    }

    Monthly download bandwidth for latest-rulesets-timestamp is about 1GB/month, and for instructions.json it's about 18GB/month. Current AWS S3 download bandwidth pricing is $0.01/GB.

    So, latest-rulesets-timestamp saves about 17 cents per month relative to instructions.json, at least with these assumptions. I don't think saving bandwidth is a strong argument for using one approach instead of the other.

  20. cschanaj commented on Mar 26, 2018

    @cschanaj
    Collaborator

    It seems to me that downstream projects will not be able to utilize this endpoint if they would like to have deterministic builds/ pinned versions. Not sure if EFF should entertain them or not in this endpoint or another. Besides, IMHO it might also worth to include the ruleset version inside default.rulesets itself.

  21. jeremyn commented on Mar 26, 2018

    @jeremyn
    Contributor

    @cschanaj As far as I know, downstream projects should be able to use and verify these rulesets if they want, or they can disable these automatic updates entirely or by default.

  22. Hainish commented on Mar 27, 2018

    @Hainish
    MemberAuthor

    @cschanaj the extension itself will still be reproducible, and the rulesets can either be verified directly using the HTTPS Everywhere signing key, or they can modify the update_channels.js file to provide their own endpoint with their own rulesets (possibly just an audited version of ours) and verify ruleset delivery with their own keys, if they don't trust ours.

  23. changed the title [-]Release 2018.4.2 forthcoming[/-] [+]Release 2018.4.3 forthcoming[/+] on Apr 2, 2018
  24. Hainish commented on Apr 2, 2018

    @Hainish
    MemberAuthor

    Pushing this to tomorrow to finish up a few loose ends (https-rulesets.org home page, ensuring updating does not occur if the extension version > the rulesets version for the "EFF (Full)" update channel.

    Georg from Tor Browser has looked through our signing code, and had some feedback which I incorporated into sign-rulesets.

  25. added a commit that references this issue on Apr 3, 2018
  26. Hainish commented on Apr 3, 2018

    @Hainish
    MemberAuthor

    Release made!

  27. jeremyn commented on Apr 3, 2018

    @jeremyn
    Contributor

    @Hainish Congratulations on getting the sign-rulesets feature out! I've argued against it before, but I want to acknowledge that it has taken a lot of work and planning from you and others to get to this point, and that you and others should feel proud for launching it. Now that the project has committed to it, I wish it well.

  28. Hainish commented on Apr 3, 2018

    @Hainish
    MemberAuthor

    Thank you @jeremyn, I really appreciate the well-wishes!

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