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Document consistency and availability assumption of watchtower infrastructure #604

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@ariard

Getting a fail-safe/highly robust watchtower model is harder than expected. As we encounter issue while moving forward we should keep track of them and draw a consistent model step by step.

See #597 (comment)

TODO: link #watchtower slack discussion on quorum-vs-consensus alternatives.

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  1. ariard commented on Aug 21, 2020

    @ariard
    Author

    One of your monitor instance may crash silently for a while and you might not learn it if you don't update_monitor() due to lack of channel updates ? Your implementation of ManyChannelMonitor might force-close preemptively channel at risk in reaction.

    See also #667 (review)

  2. ariard commented on Aug 26, 2020

    @ariard
    Author

    Watchtower Alice receives block 100, broadcasts state X, rejects state Y.
    Watchtower Bob accepts state Y, receives block 100, broadcasts state Y.
    State Y confirms onchain. Alice must be able to claim outputs.
    State Y is rejected by watchtower coordinator Caroll, secret for state X isn't released.

    See also #667 (comment)

  3. TheBlueMatt commented on Aug 26, 2020

    @TheBlueMatt
    Collaborator

    Right, I think the only way to solve that pattern is to have some kind of consensus on when to broadcast a transaction - if you can't get a majority of watchtowers to agree to halt updates, then you shouldn't be able to broadcast a transaction as otherwise a majority of watchtowers could revoke the now-broadcast transaction.

  4. devrandom commented on Aug 29, 2020

    @devrandom
    Member

    I think there are two separate animals here.

    • a watchtower is an external untrusted service, which can only publish justice txs. the security property of a watchtower is that if you subscribe to n of them, you will be safe if at least 1 does the right thing

    • a highly available distributed channel-monitor, which can also publish commitment txs. I would consider this as part of the node deployment, because you have to trust it with both privacy and security of the funds. All of the monitor instances must have a correctly working HSM, because they have sensitive keys that can cause loss of all funds in the channel.

    I agree with @TheBlueMatt - the HSMs embedded in each channel-monitor must achieve consensus in order to move the state forward (e.g. revoke an old state). This can be achieved with a majority voting scheme.

  5. ariard commented on Aug 31, 2020

    @ariard
    Author

    I like the distinction, but note that usually LN folks have used private/public watchtower for the trusted-vs-untrusted deployment. Though it hasn't been done with that much rigor. You may delegate running one instance of your distributed channel-monitor to a third-party, you may have out-of-band remedies against them, that's up to you.

    That said, I think than less-than-unanimity to move state forward (i.e accept ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTxInfo) is unsafe as otherwise a subset of your monitors may broadcast previous now-revoked states. For accepting remote commitment transaction update, a majority is enough as there is no toxicity involved.

  6. TheBlueMatt commented on Sep 14, 2020

    @TheBlueMatt
    Collaborator

    I think after a bunch of back and forth @ariard and I are on a similar page - there are really two supported modes here (or should be) - either you get majority consensus of your monitors for each action (including broadcasting) or you get 100% consensus of your monitors for updates (but any one monitor can broadcast on its own). Still #679 makes it easier to build the second since it avoids the need to do complicated pre-consensus, allowing you to simple apply new updates to monitors and wait until all monitors have verified they've applied the update before moving the channel forward.

  7. ariard commented on Sep 15, 2020

    @ariard
    Author

    Describe responsibilities between a) off-chain manager b) monitor coordinator c) per-channel monitor.

  8. ariard commented on Sep 25, 2020

    @ariard
    Author

    For remote watchers, we may have race conditions between learning of a revocation secrets and a counterparty commitment transaction as a former can happen after the latter. Verify or do something.

  9. ariard commented on Oct 3, 2020

    @ariard
    Author

    Document different internal monitor backup strategies.

    See #681 (comment)

  10. ariard commented on Oct 3, 2020

    @ariard
    Author

    We may have hints that coordinator is buggy or compromised based on our local state. If this happen, we may go onchain to avoid further risks.

    See #681 (comment)

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