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Fuzz target for read_from_bytes over arbitrary bytes #33
Add a libfuzzer target that calls read_from_bytes (src/core/src/liquid_array/ipc.rs:251) on arbitrary bytes and requires it to either return a valid array or fail cleanly — never panic, never read out of bounds, never allocate on an attacker-controlled length.
Why this one belongs in libfuzzer
Everything else in #22's encoding work is structured generation and belongs in cargo test. This is the exception: the input genuinely is an untrusted byte string, and coverage-guided mutation over the header and body layout is exactly the right tool.
The deserializer reads a header (ipc.rs:185-210) and dispatches on a logical and physical type id, with expect_physical_type (ipc.rs:153) and From<u16> for LiquidDataType (liquid_array/mod.rs:66-78) both panicking on unknown values. Panicking on a corrupt on-disk entry is at best an availability problem.
Scope
Read arbitrary bytes as a liquid IPC payload; assert no panic and no UB.
Run under ASAN, which the repo already does for liquid-cache-datafusion — extend the same treatment here.
Add to the nightly workflow's target matrix alongside fsst_view.
Open question worth answering as part of this
Are on-disk entries trusted? If the disk tier is assumed non-adversarial, the bar is "no panic on a torn or truncated write" rather than "no panic on arbitrary bytes" — a lower bar, but still not the current behaviour, since a partial write is exactly what an interrupted process leaves behind. Decide and document which model applies.
Acceptance
Target runs clean for a sustained nightly session.
Header validation rejects unknown type ids with an error rather than a panic.
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