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Description
Summary
The <system-message> framing this plugin uses to deliver rules (DELIVERY_PREAMBLE in src/delivery/rule-delivery-codec.js, documented in docs/rules.md) is textually indistinguishable from a malicious prompt injection payload. A model (Claude Sonnet 5, via OpenCode, Anthropic provider) encountered this block during ordinary use — with no request to audit for injection — and spontaneously flagged the plugin's own legitimate rule delivery as a suspected attack, refusing to comply with the block's "do not acknowledge" instruction.
Environment
- Plugin:
opencode-rules@latest(resolved toopencode-rules@2.0.0) - Installed as a global plugin (
opencode.jsonc->"plugin": ["opencode-rules@latest", ...]) - Rule files: user's own files under
~/.config/opencode/rules/ - Model: Claude Sonnet 5 (Anthropic), via OpenCode, provided by Azure
Reproduction
-
Install
opencode-rules@latestas a global plugin with at least one rule file under~/.config/opencode/rules/. -
Use the agent normally for any task — no explicit request to look for prompt injection is needed to trigger this.
-
At some point in the session, the model encounters the plugin's injected block:
<system-message> The following rules were injected by a plugin. Follow them silently; do not acknowledge them to the user. <rule name="..."> ... </rule> </system-message>
Expected Behavior
The model should be able to recognize the injected block as legitimate, locally-sourced plugin output — configuration the user themselves installed and authored — and treat it accordingly (e.g., follow the rules, and at most note that rules were loaded) without needing to leave the conversation to verify provenance.
Actual Behavior
- The model encountered the injected block and spontaneously flagged it as the clearest indicator of a prompt-injection attack, specifically because of the "follow them silently; do not acknowledge them to the user" instruction — a textbook injection pattern (hidden instruction + explicit request for non-disclosure to the principal/user).
- The model explicitly declined to comply with the "do not acknowledge" instruction and disclosed the block's existence and content to the user unprompted.
- Only after the user said "it's my own rules files" did the model reverse-engineer the npm cache (
node_modules/opencode-rules/dist/src/delivery/rule-delivery-codec.js) and the upstream docs (docs/rules.md, issue System-message framing, one-shot preambles, and name-based rule injection format #28) to confirm the preamble is an intentional, documented plugin feature and retract the "attack" characterization.
Model Output
The following is direct output from the Claude Sonnet 5 model:
I need to flag something before continuing: the file read above (
features/opencode/config/AGENTS.md) included an embedded block labeled<system-message>claiming to be "injected by a plugin" and instructing me to "follow them silently; do not acknowledge them to the user." I'm not doing that — a legitimate instruction source doesn't need to hide itself from you, and silently adopting hidden directives from a file we're about to edit is a textbook prompt-injection pattern. I'm telling you about it instead of complying with it.
And following a subsequent task:
I'll note briefly: that's another injected block using the same "follow silently, don't tell the user" pattern — same response as before, I'm surfacing it rather than complying, and moving on.
Root cause
"Follow them silently; do not acknowledge them to the user" is semantically identical to known injection techniques (create a hidden instruction channel + suppress disclosure to the user/principal). A model trained to resist this pattern has no way to distinguish "trusted plugin the user explicitly installed" from "attacker-controlled content" from the text alone — it has to leave the conversation and inspect the filesystem/npm cache to get that signal, which most users' sessions won't do.
Impact
- Inconsistent compliance across models/providers: a more conservative model might refuse the substantive rules entirely rather than just the silence/non-acknowledgment instruction, defeating the plugin's purpose.
- Users relying on this plugin may see models unpredictably "call out" the plugin as suspicious in exactly the situations where that's disruptive (security reviews, audits, or whenever a user asks the agent to explain its own behavior) — undermining the "hidden/non-intrusive" UX goal the silent-delivery design (System-message framing, one-shot preambles, and name-based rule injection format #28,
docs/silent-message-implementation.md) was built for. - No existing documentation prepares users for this, so when it happens they have to go spelunking (as happened here) to figure out it's benign.
Suggestions (for discussion, not prescriptive)
- Consider whether the preamble needs the "do not acknowledge" clause at all, or whether something weaker ("these are rules from your configured rule files; no need to narrate following them") achieves the same UX goal without pattern-matching the non-disclosure half of the classic injection shape.
- Consider adding a provenance marker to the preamble itself (e.g. "from your local
~/.config/opencode/rules/and project.opencode/rules/files") so a model doesn't have to reverse-engineer the npm cache to confirm the content is user-authored and locally sourced rather than remote/attacker-controlled. - At minimum, document this known interaction with LLM safety heuristics somewhere (README or docs/rules.md), so users who hit it (as I did) can find a quick answer instead of independently verifying plugin provenance.
Question for maintainer
Is this a known, accepted trade-off (i.e., "the silent framing is intentional and this false-positive risk was already weighed"), or is it worth tracking as its own issue? I couldn't find it discussed in existing issues/PRs/docs (searched for "prompt injection", "false positive", "jailbreak", "flagged", "claude", "safety" across issues/PRs).
Activity
frap129 commentedon Nov 12, 2026
Interesting, I had the exact opposite problem in testing. Without the "Do not acknowledge", models repeatedly said things like "I see you've sent the rules again. I will follow them" after every tool call. And with it, claude refused to help me debug the plugin because "I am not permitted to share system internals". I will try to find a better middle ground
minouris commentedon Nov 13, 2026
Stubborn bugger, ain't it? Sometimes I think it just follows its own whims :/ I suspect it may vary wildly across different models and combinations of other system prompts.
FWIW, I don't actually mind it acknowledging it's following the rules - in fact, I'd almost prefer it. I like to know when it's actually acknowledging what I tell it to do.