Please do not open a public issue for security problems. Instead, report them privately via GitHub's security advisories or by email to sohilmomin2000@gmail.com.
Include a description, steps to reproduce, and the impact you believe it has. We aim to acknowledge reports within a few days.
- Cipher: AES-256-GCM (authenticated).
- KDF: Argon2id (default) or PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 (optional, lighter).
- Argon2id parameters: m = 19456 KiB, t = 2, p = 1.
- PBKDF2 iterations: 250,000.
- Random salt (16 bytes) and IV (12 bytes) per file, from a CSPRNG.
- Keyfile: optional; mixed in as
HMAC-SHA256(derived_key, keyfile_bytes). - Recipient mode: X25519 hybrid encryption — a fresh ephemeral keypair per file, shared secret
fed to HKDF-SHA256 (info
lockhtml/x25519), then AES-256-GCM. An optional PIN extends the HKDF input; a keyfile pepper is applied on top. No slow KDF is used, since the ECDH secret is already 256 bits of entropy. See docs/FORMAT.md. - Shares mode: the 32-byte key seed is split with Shamir's scheme over GF(256) (polynomial
0x11b); the key isHKDF-SHA256(seed || pin, salt, info="lockhtml/shamir")with an optional keyfile pepper. Shares are distributed separately and never stored in the locked file. See docs/FORMAT.md. - Hidden volume: additional payloads ("slots") encrypted under their own PINs, each with its own
salt and IV, exactly like the main payload.
decrypt_anytries the main payload, then every slot, then the decoy. - age interop: the CLI can read and write age v1 files (X25519 recipients). This is a from-scratch implementation of a published format; it is verified against the reference implementation but has not had an independent security review. See docs/AGE.md.
- Signing: optional Ed25519 over the ciphertext (embedded) or over the MAC input (streaming); verified in-browser before display.
- Streaming container: AES-256-GCM per 1 MiB chunk, nonce =
base_iv || uint32_be(index), chunk index bound as Additional Authenticated Data, and a whole-file HMAC-SHA256 over the metadata and all chunk tags. This detects reordering, duplication, truncation and metadata tampering. See docs/FORMAT.md.
Full details are in docs/FORMAT.md. A self-audit is recorded in
docs/AUDIT.md — note that this is a self-review, not an independent audit.
LockHTML is a client-side tool. Understanding its threat model matters:
- The PIN provides real confidentiality: the document is encrypted with AES-256-GCM and the key is derived with Argon2id. Without the PIN (and keyfile, if used) the content is unreadable, even from the raw source.
- The streaming container's MAC is keyed by the PIN-derived key, so it protects integrity but not authenticity — only an Ed25519 signature proves who produced the file. Sign when that matters.
- A hidden volume is plausible deniability, not proof of absence. The extra slots are visible in the file's JSON to anyone who looks — they simply cannot be decrypted without their PIN. It protects against someone being shown the cover content, not against a forensic look at the file.
- Shares move the secret, not the trust. k-1 shares reveal nothing about the seed, but any k holders can reconstruct it, and a reconstructed seed cannot be revoked — re-lock the file with a fresh split if shares are exposed.
- Recipient mode moves the secret, not the trust. Whoever holds the private key can open every file locked to it, and a leaked private key cannot be revoked. Rotate keys if one is exposed.
- View limits, expiry, watermarking and one-time view are best-effort. Enforcement happens in the browser (IndexedDB). A recipient who controls their machine can defeat it — copy the file, use another browser/profile, clear storage, or screenshot the decrypted page. This is a known and documented limitation, not a vulnerability.
- The tool is not designed to resist an adversary who has the PIN, the decrypted plaintext, or full control of the recipient's device.
Reports that assume a server-enforced single-view guarantee are out of scope; that guarantee is not offered.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 1.1.x | ✅ |
| 1.0.x |