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Security: drsamonline/Sorta

Security

SECURITY.md

Security policy

Version 1.0 · effective 20 Nov 2026.

Supported versions

Sorta is pre-1.0. Only the latest release gets fixes; there are no backports.

Version Supported
0.1.x (latest) yes
anything older no

Reporting a vulnerability

Please do not open a public issue for a vulnerability.

  1. Preferred: GitHub → the repository's Security tab → Report a vulnerability (private advisory). This keeps the report, the fix and the eventual disclosure in one place.
  2. If that is unavailable: email sohilmomin2000@gmail.com with Sorta security in the subject.

Include what you have: affected version or commit, platform, a description, and the smallest reproduction you can manage — a file, a folder layout, or the exact command. A crash with a backtrace is more useful than a theory.

What to expect

Best effort, by one maintainer, with no SLA and no bug bounty:

  • acknowledgement within about 7 days,
  • an assessment of severity and a fix or mitigation plan after that,
  • credit in the release notes if you want it.

In scope

The sorta binary and the crates in this repository. Specific areas where a bug would be serious:

  • Path handling — traversal, symlinks, .., Windows device names, long paths, case-insensitive collisions, anything that moves a file somewhere it should not.
  • Data loss — a move that loses bytes, a rollback that does not roll back, a replace policy that destroys a file it should have kept, retention deleting something it promised not to touch.
  • Hook quoting — a filename that escapes the quoting in [hooks] on_sort and runs a command of its own.
  • Locks — a stale lock that wedges a folder forever, or two processes racing into the same destination name.
  • Audit chain — an edit to audit.jsonl that sorta audit verify reports as intact.
  • Parsing — a crafted file that panics the binary, or that makes it allocate without bound.
  • Secrets — anything that leaks a key you configured.
  • The control channel — a loopback TCP listener whose port is published in ~/.sorta/port. It answers ping and status only, reads nothing from the caller beyond the request, and is bound to 127.0.0.1. Any local process can query it; that is the same trust level as the state directory itself. If a future version adds a command that changes state, it must authenticate first; a report that it does not is a valid finding.

Out of scope

  • Bugs in dependencies (report them upstream — turso, pdf-extract, notify and the rest; tell us too if it affects Sorta).
  • The quality or safety of classification decisions, and the output of any embedding or language model you configure. Sorta never deletes a file on the strength of a guess; a wrong folder is a bug, not a vulnerability.
  • Hooks you write yourself, and anything the program you install as an embedding engine does.
  • Vulnerabilities that require an attacker to already have write access to your home directory.

Good-faith research

Testing on your own machine, with your own files, is fine. Do not run tests against other people's systems, do not access data that is not yours, and give us a reasonable window to fix a finding before publishing it.

A note on the audit chain

audit_enabled = true writes a BLAKE3 hash chain, which detects an edit by anyone who does not recompute the chain. It is not a signature: someone with write access who recomputes every link can produce a consistent forgery. If you need that guarantee, sign or ship the log off the machine.

There aren't any published security advisories