Version 1.0 · effective 20 Nov 2026.
Sorta is pre-1.0. Only the latest release gets fixes; there are no backports.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 0.1.x (latest) | yes |
| anything older | no |
Please do not open a public issue for a vulnerability.
- Preferred: GitHub → the repository's Security tab → Report a vulnerability (private advisory). This keeps the report, the fix and the eventual disclosure in one place.
- If that is unavailable: email sohilmomin2000@gmail.com with
Sorta securityin the subject.
Include what you have: affected version or commit, platform, a description, and the smallest reproduction you can manage — a file, a folder layout, or the exact command. A crash with a backtrace is more useful than a theory.
Best effort, by one maintainer, with no SLA and no bug bounty:
- acknowledgement within about 7 days,
- an assessment of severity and a fix or mitigation plan after that,
- credit in the release notes if you want it.
The sorta binary and the crates in this repository. Specific areas where a bug
would be serious:
- Path handling — traversal, symlinks,
.., Windows device names, long paths, case-insensitive collisions, anything that moves a file somewhere it should not. - Data loss — a move that loses bytes, a rollback that does not roll back, a
replacepolicy that destroys a file it should have kept, retention deleting something it promised not to touch. - Hook quoting — a filename that escapes the quoting in
[hooks] on_sortand runs a command of its own. - Locks — a stale lock that wedges a folder forever, or two processes racing into the same destination name.
- Audit chain — an edit to
audit.jsonlthatsorta audit verifyreports as intact. - Parsing — a crafted file that panics the binary, or that makes it allocate without bound.
- Secrets — anything that leaks a key you configured.
- The control channel — a loopback TCP listener whose port is published in
~/.sorta/port. It answerspingandstatusonly, reads nothing from the caller beyond the request, and is bound to127.0.0.1. Any local process can query it; that is the same trust level as the state directory itself. If a future version adds a command that changes state, it must authenticate first; a report that it does not is a valid finding.
- Bugs in dependencies (report them upstream —
turso,pdf-extract,notifyand the rest; tell us too if it affects Sorta). - The quality or safety of classification decisions, and the output of any embedding or language model you configure. Sorta never deletes a file on the strength of a guess; a wrong folder is a bug, not a vulnerability.
- Hooks you write yourself, and anything the program you install as an embedding engine does.
- Vulnerabilities that require an attacker to already have write access to your home directory.
Testing on your own machine, with your own files, is fine. Do not run tests against other people's systems, do not access data that is not yours, and give us a reasonable window to fix a finding before publishing it.
audit_enabled = true writes a BLAKE3 hash chain, which detects an edit by anyone
who does not recompute the chain. It is not a signature: someone with write access
who recomputes every link can produce a consistent forgery. If you need that
guarantee, sign or ship the log off the machine.