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chore(deps): update dependency vite to v8 [security] - #18
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This PR contains the following updates:
^5.2.11→^8.0.0Vite Vulnerable to Path Traversal in Optimized Deps
.mapHandlingCVE-2026-39365 / GHSA-4w7w-66w2-5vf9
More information
Details
Summary
Any files ending with
.mapeven out side the project can be returned to the browser.Impact
Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:
--hostorserver.hostconfig option).mapand the path is predictableDetails
In Vite v7.3.1, the dev server’s handling of
.maprequests for optimized dependencies resolves file paths and callsreadFilewithout restricting../segments in the URL. As a result, it is possible to bypass theserver.fs.strictallow list and retrieve.mapfiles located outside the project root, provided they can be parsed as valid source map JSON.PoC
/@fsaccess is blocked bystrict(returns 403)../segments under the optimized deps.mapURL prefix to reach/tmp/poc.mapSeverity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NReferences
This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
vite:
server.fs.denybypass on Windows alternate pathsCVE-2026-53571 / GHSA-fx2h-pf6j-xcff
More information
Details
Summary
The contents of files that are specified by
server.fs.denycan be returned to the browser on Windows.Impact
Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:
--hostorserver.hostconfig option)server.fs.allowDetails
Vite’s dev server denies direct access to sensitive files through
server.fs.deny, including entries such as.env,.env.*, and*.{crt,pem}. However, on Windows, the deny logic does not correctly normalize NTFS ADS path forms before access checks are applied.Because of this, requests such as
/.env::$DATA?raware treated as allowed paths, while Windows resolves them to the original file's default data stream.Similar to that, Windows allows accessing a file using a different name with the 8.3 short name compatibility feature. Vite did not reject accessing files via them.
PoC
$ npm create vite@latest $ cd vite-project/ $ npm install $ npm run devAccess via browser at

http://localhost:5173/.env::$DATA?rawExample expected result:
/.env::$DATA?rawreturns the contents of.env/tls.pem::$DATA?rawreturns the contents oftls.pemSeverity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:NReferences
This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
launch-editor: NTLMv2 hash disclosure via UNC path handling on Windows
CVE-2026-53632 / GHSA-v6wh-96g9-6wx3
More information
Details
Summary
The
launch-editorNPM package accesses arbitrary paths including Windows UNC paths. When a UNC path is opened, Windows automatically attempts NTLM authentication to the remote host, causing the user’s NTLMv2 password hash to be leaked to an attacker-controlled SMB server. This can result in credential compromise through offline hash cracking.Impact
If the following conditions are met, an attacker can get the NTLMv2 password hash on the computer that is using the
launch-editor:launch-editorlaunch-editoris runningThis would be a problem if the user password is too simple that it can be identified through offline hash cracking, potentially leading to further compromise of developer accounts or internal systems.
Details
launch-editoraccepts file paths without validating or restricting Windows UNC paths such as:On Windows systems, accessing a UNC path triggers an automatic NTLM authentication attempt to the remote SMB server. No user interaction or warning is required for this authentication attempt to occur.
If an attacker controls the SMB server referenced by the UNC path the victim’s NTLMv2 hash is transmitted to the attacker. The attacker can then capture the hash and perform offline password cracking. Successful cracking reveals the victim’s cleartext password.
The attacker could target a developer that uses a development server using
launch-editorto develop code locally, send them a link and grab their NTLMv2 hash.PoC
From the attacker side, we will setup an SMB server. I personally used Impacket's smbserver.py, but you could use something like Responder for this as well. For keeping it simple, we will use
smbserver.pyhere.First, let's create a directory to serve as an SMB share.
Then, start the SMB server.
Now, run any project that uses the launch-editor package. I have setup a simple "Hello world" project that uses Vite to do this. Then run the project locally (
vite).Now last, we will open a browser window and navigate to the URL used by the launch-editor package to trigger the NTLM authentication. Or we can use
curlto achieve the same.Note the IP address in the HTTP request, and make sure it connects to the IP address of the SMB server. Now we can look at the logs of
smbserver.pyand see the NTLMv2 hash coming in.Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:HReferences
This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
launch-editor: escapeCmdArgs() omits % escaping on Windows
CVE-2026-112943 / GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv
More information
Details
Summary
launch-editordid not escape%on Windows when passing an argument tocmd. When an environment variable contained a malicious value, it was possible that that content to be executed.Impact
Only apps that match all of the following conditions are affected:
&or%Details
Unlike
.shfiles,.bat/.cmdfiles on Windows cannot be called directly usingchild_process.spawnand requires passing them as an argument ofcmd.exe. To do so, launch-editor escapes the arguments passed tocmd.exe. Butlaunch-editordid not escape%which is used for environment variables.Because
launch-editorchecks if the argument matches an existing filename, the attack requires the attacker to be able to place a file.&calc.exeto%ENV%) and calllaunchEditorwithsomething%ENV%.~-38%calc.exe), they can calllaunchEditorwithsomething %CMDCMDLINE:~-38%calc.exe.%CD%and the subcommand (e.g.&calc.exe), they can calllaunchEditorwith./%CD%Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NReferences
This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
launch-editor:
fs.existsSync()existence check can be bypassed on WindowsCVE-2026-112942 / GHSA-587h-7wmj-h5pm
More information
Details
Summary
launch-editorcheckedfs.existsSync(fileName)before passing a supplied path to an editor command. On Windows, an attacker can bypass this check with a crafted path ending in\\..:line:column. This removes the requirement that the attacker be able to place a file with a malicious filename.Combined with the
%escaping issue described in GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv, this bypass can lead to OS command injection when an attacker controls the file argument.Impact
Only apps that runs on Windows is affected.
Details
The earlier advisory assumed that
fs.existsSync()required an attacker-controlled filename to exist. This advisory covers a bypass of that requirement.A crafted value ending in
\\..:1:1is interpreted differently bylaunch-editor-middleware,launch-editor, and Windows:launch-editor-middlewarecallspath.resolve()while the final path component is..:1:1, so it is not treated as a parent-directory component.launch-editortreats:1:1as a line-and-column suffix and removes it, leaving a path ending in\\...fs.existsSync()accepts the resulting path as the existing parent directory even though the attacker-controlled preceding component does not exist.Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NReferences
This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Vite: Files outside
server.fs.allowcould be served when project paths match system paths on non-Windows machineCVE-2026-112946 / GHSA-rq7h-c2jc-7f22
More information
Details
Summary
The content of files outside
server.fssetting can be returned to the browser if the project imports a file path concatenated with theroot. For example, if the project references<path-to-project-root>/etc/hosts, the content of/etc/hostswas possible to be returned.The content of files outside the
server.fs.allowoption can be returned to the browser when a project imports a file whose root-relative path matches an absolute path on the host. For example, referencing<project-root>/etc/hostscould make Vite return the host's/etc/hostsfile.Impact
Only apps that meet all of the following conditions are affected:
--hostor theserver.hostoption)server.fs.denyDetails
When Vite analyzes an in-root import, it rewrites the resolved module ID to a browser URL such as
/etc/hostname. In affected versions, Vite converts that URL withfsPathFromUrland adds the result tosafeModulePaths. BecausefsPathFromUrlensures a leading slash without resolving the URL against the project root, the project URL/etc/hostnameis recorded as if it were the absolute filesystem path/etc/hostname.For a later request to
/@fs/etc/hostname, the raw-filesystem middleware interprets/etc/hostnameas an absolute path. The access check appliesserver.fs.deny, then accepts paths present insafeModulePathsbefore checkingserver.fs.allow. As a result, the request can return the host file instead of the project file that originally populatedsafeModulePaths.PoC
The following example requires Linux with a readable
/etc/hostname:In another terminal:
Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NReferences
This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Release Notes
vitejs/vite (vite)
v8.3.8Compare Source
Bug Fixes
magicStringandastin transform hook meta (#24012) (a3b28e8)build.cssCodeSplit: false(#23112) (e4ad62b)yarn config geton Windows (#24013) (3f6c4cd)Performance Improvements
net useuntil a UNC path is resolved on Windows (#24014) (b643046)Miscellaneous Chores
magicStringandastin transform hook meta (#24012)" (#24065) (afc44f0)Code Refactoring
Tests
v8.3.7Compare Source
Bug Fixes
Miscellaneous Chores
Tests
onTestFinishedfor tear downs (#24003) (a579e35)Build System
v8.3.6Compare Source
Bug Fixes
@rollup/plugin-aliasto v6.0.1 (#23862) (67c965b)server.forwardConsole(#23933) (4f340fd)build.sourcemapfrom environment (#23879) (82e7aa0)$patterns in static alias replacements (#23703) (1b6ed05)ssr.target=webworker(#23759) (a711f1c)inputfor SSR build whenbuild.ssr: true(#23898) (90bc034).wasmoutsideserver.fs(#23914) (64e2467)new URL(..., import.meta.url)(#23780) (e954a9c)Performance Improvements
cssScopeTo(#23889) (1b905e5)Miscellaneous Chores
Build System
v8.3.5Compare Source
Bug Fixes
server.originto asset URLs (#23683) (52ba877)import.meta.env.*defines in theimport.meta.envobject (#23713) (6019aa7)%inurl()(#23676) (50b382d)oxc.jsxInjectimports (#23758) (38f3cb4)#(#23631) (0d86b34)Performance Improvements
Miscellaneous Chores
Code Refactoring
@vercel/detect-agentwithstd-env(#23744) (ce4293f)v8.3.4Compare Source
Features
import.meta.hot.acceptExports(#23463) (bc0f21c)Bug Fixes
/@vite/clientand stub@vite/env(#23664) (5afc5a8)ensureWatchedFile(#23673) (12bb28c)Performance Improvements
Code Refactoring
/@vite/client(#23674) (182f5b2)v8.3.3Compare Source
Bug Fixes
fs.servefor?vite-wasm-instance(#23655) (ba8b7ab)safeModulePathsrather than URLs (#23656) (c3e06f9)v8.3.2Compare Source
Bug Fixes
renderBuiltUrlreturns URLs with queries (#23611) (64e0a21)forwardConsole(#23565) (e64a587)build.rolldownOptions.output.minifycorrectly (#23536) (bba3bb8)renderBuiltUrl([#23586](https:Configuration
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