🔒 Fix Directory Traversal in tar unpack

[Tcode-Motion]

🎯 What: Fixed a Directory Traversal vulnerability in the untar_archive function in stdlib/src/compress.rs.
⚠️ Risk: The previous implementation used tar::Archive::unpack(), which does not provide built-in directory traversal protections. An attacker could provide a malicious tarball with paths like ../../etc/passwd, allowing them to write files outside of the intended extraction destination directory and potentially overwrite critical system files or source code.
🛡️ Solution: The implementation was updated to manually iterate over a.entries() and call entry.unpack_in(dest_dir). The unpack_in method contains built-in sanity checks that prevent paths containing .. or absolute paths from escaping the target extraction directory.

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PR created automatically by Jules for task 15510206791587803934 started by @Tcode-Motion

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