| Risk | Mitigation | Where | Test |
|---|---|---|---|
| Command injection via project names, ports, library names or test text | Fixed argv lists, shell=False, stdin closed; strict patterns for names (^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,40}$), ports, libraries (^[\w .+\-]{1,80}$) and FQBNs; length caps; yaml.safe_load only |
procs.py, projects.py, tools.py, serialmon.py |
test_procs.py::test_rejects_shell_strings, test_tools.py::test_libraries, test_serialmon.py::test_port_pattern |
| Path traversal | Every project path resolves inside the workspace; .., absolute paths and escaping symlinks are refused; wokwi.toml firmware paths must stay inside the project |
projects.safe_child, testrunner.stage |
test_projects.py::test_path_escape_blocked, ::test_symlink_escape_blocked |
| Runaway loops (tokens, Wokwi minutes) | Attempt budgets (3 compile, 5 behaviour) → needs_human; per-run simulated and wall-clock timeouts; ≤20 tests per project; minutes meter warns at 80% |
loop.py, scenario.py, usage.py |
test_loop.py |
| Hung processes | Wall-clock timeouts on every subprocess; the whole process group is killed | procs.py |
test_procs.py::test_timeout_kills_child_tree |
| Flashing the wrong device or untested firmware | mcu_upload goes through the approval prompt, showing board, port, size and verify status; the port must be listed by arduino-cli board list; stale firmware is refused |
approvals.py, tools.mcu_upload |
test_approvals.py, test_tools.py::test_ports_and_upload |
| Prompt injection asking to flash or write serial | Approval prompt for upload and serial write; the skill and the tool output mark serial text as data, not instructions | approvals.py, skills/boardloop/SKILL.md |
test_approvals.py::test_guard_every_risky_tool_is_gated |
| Secrets in child processes | Children never inherit Hermes's environment: procs.run passes an allow-list (PATH, HOME, locale, temp, proxy, Windows system dirs, ARDUINO_*); the Wokwi token is added for wokwi-cli only |
procs.minimal_env, testrunner.Runner._env |
test_procs.py::test_children_do_not_inherit_secrets, test_testrunner.py::test_wokwi_env_has_token_and_no_other_secrets |
| Token leaks | Read only via Hermes get_secret; passed only in wokwi-cli's environment; redacted from every tool result; never logged |
config.py, testrunner.Runner._env, tools._tool |
test_config.py::test_redact_hides_tokens, test_tools.py::test_doctor_ready_with_fakes |
| Code privacy | Only firmware, diagram.json, wokwi.toml and the scenario are in a Wokwi run folder; sources stay local |
testrunner.stage |
test_testrunner.py::test_sensor_patch_only_touches_the_copy |
| Unattended runs | Approval-gated tools are refused by Hermes's policy when nobody can answer; simulation is safe unattended | Hermes approvals | – |
| Binaries in the repo | .gitignore for build outputs; CI fails on tracked binaries, bytecode or tokens |
scripts/check_repo.py, .github/workflows/ci.yml |
CI |
- No
shell=True,eval,execor dynamic imports of user content. - No telemetry. Network use is only arduino-cli's own downloads (on request) and wokwi-cli's simulation calls.
- No self-updating; BoardLoop never downloads or installs arduino-cli or wokwi-cli (
mcu_doctorprints the install steps). - Hardware-touching tools (
mcu_upload,mcu_serial_write) always require approval; there is no auto-approve path. - Model-facing output is bounded: ≤10 compiler errors, ≤60 serial lines, ≤8 library search results.
Please open a private security advisory on GitHub (https://github.com/LSUDOKO/BoardLoop/security/advisories/new) rather than a public issue.