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Security: LLCForge/Pathology

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Pathology runs close to network infrastructure, so we take security reports seriously and appreciate responsible disclosure.

Supported versions

Version Supported
Latest release Yes
main branch Yes (best effort)
Older releases No, please upgrade

Reporting a vulnerability

Do not open a public issue, discussion or pull request for security problems.

Report privately through GitHub Security Advisories:

  1. Go to https://github.com/LLCForge/Pathology/security/advisories/new.
  2. Describe the issue, affected version or commit, and steps to reproduce.
  3. Include a proof of concept if you have one. Strip any real customer data, IP addresses or credentials from captures and logs.

What to expect:

  • Acknowledgement within 3 business days.
  • An initial assessment and severity rating within 10 business days.
  • A fix or mitigation plan, coordinated disclosure date, and credit in the advisory (unless you prefer to stay anonymous).

In scope

  • Remote crash or memory exhaustion via crafted BMP / BGP messages, MRT files or AS relationship files.
  • Bypass of the allowed_peers allowlist or the passive BGP peer / ASN checks.
  • The passive BGP listener sending anything other than OPEN, KEEPALIVE or NOTIFICATION (it must never advertise a route).
  • Route API (/v1/routes, /v1/prefixes/<p>/paths, /v1/origins): bearer-token bypass, resource exhaustion despite the documented limits, data beyond what the API documents.
  • Web UI: script injection through route data (prefixes, AS paths, communities), loading of external resources.
  • Management listener: bypass of the /v1/silences or /v1/reload tokens.
  • Leakage of credentials (alert sink secrets, API / admin / Notary tokens) in logs, alerts or errors.
  • Dependency vulnerabilities that are reachable from Pathology's code paths.

Out of scope

  • Vulnerabilities in third-party services or protocols themselves (report those upstream).
  • Issues that require an attacker to already control the host or the config file.
  • Denial of service by volumetric flooding of the network the tool runs on.

Attack surface

Surface Default Protection
BMP collector 0.0.0.0:11019 source allowlist, 128 KiB message cap, bounded channel
Passive BGP listener off (collector.bgp) peer address allowlist, ASN check, hold timer, 64 KiB message cap; no TCP-MD5
Route API + web UI 127.0.0.1:8180 read-only, optional bearer token, CSP / nosniff / DENY framing, 64 concurrent requests, 10 s timeout, result caps
Management (/metrics, health, silences, reload) off until [metrics] listen is set silences / reload need bearer tokens; metrics and health are unauthenticated
Notary client off until [notary] is set outbound only, no redirects, timeout, response size / value checks
MRT import, relationship file local files size caps (16 MiB per MRT record, 256 MiB relationship file), skip-on-error

Hardening recommendations

  • Run as an unprivileged user; grant only the capabilities the tool needs (CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE only if the passive BGP listener uses port 179).
  • Bind the management and API listeners to localhost or a management network, and set api.token_env when the API is reachable by others.
  • Restrict the BMP and BGP ports to your routers with a firewall; the passive BGP session has no TCP-MD5.
  • Keep secrets in environment variables or your secret manager, never in the config file or in version control.

There aren't any published security advisories