Pathology runs close to network infrastructure, so we take security reports seriously and appreciate responsible disclosure.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| Latest release | Yes |
main branch |
Yes (best effort) |
| Older releases | No, please upgrade |
Do not open a public issue, discussion or pull request for security problems.
Report privately through GitHub Security Advisories:
- Go to https://github.com/LLCForge/Pathology/security/advisories/new.
- Describe the issue, affected version or commit, and steps to reproduce.
- Include a proof of concept if you have one. Strip any real customer data, IP addresses or credentials from captures and logs.
What to expect:
- Acknowledgement within 3 business days.
- An initial assessment and severity rating within 10 business days.
- A fix or mitigation plan, coordinated disclosure date, and credit in the advisory (unless you prefer to stay anonymous).
- Remote crash or memory exhaustion via crafted BMP / BGP messages, MRT files or AS relationship files.
- Bypass of the
allowed_peersallowlist or the passive BGP peer / ASN checks. - The passive BGP listener sending anything other than OPEN, KEEPALIVE or NOTIFICATION (it must never advertise a route).
- Route API (
/v1/routes,/v1/prefixes/<p>/paths,/v1/origins): bearer-token bypass, resource exhaustion despite the documented limits, data beyond what the API documents. - Web UI: script injection through route data (prefixes, AS paths, communities), loading of external resources.
- Management listener: bypass of the
/v1/silencesor/v1/reloadtokens. - Leakage of credentials (alert sink secrets, API / admin / Notary tokens) in logs, alerts or errors.
- Dependency vulnerabilities that are reachable from Pathology's code paths.
- Vulnerabilities in third-party services or protocols themselves (report those upstream).
- Issues that require an attacker to already control the host or the config file.
- Denial of service by volumetric flooding of the network the tool runs on.
| Surface | Default | Protection |
|---|---|---|
| BMP collector | 0.0.0.0:11019 |
source allowlist, 128 KiB message cap, bounded channel |
| Passive BGP listener | off (collector.bgp) |
peer address allowlist, ASN check, hold timer, 64 KiB message cap; no TCP-MD5 |
| Route API + web UI | 127.0.0.1:8180 |
read-only, optional bearer token, CSP / nosniff / DENY framing, 64 concurrent requests, 10 s timeout, result caps |
Management (/metrics, health, silences, reload) |
off until [metrics] listen is set |
silences / reload need bearer tokens; metrics and health are unauthenticated |
| Notary client | off until [notary] is set |
outbound only, no redirects, timeout, response size / value checks |
| MRT import, relationship file | local files | size caps (16 MiB per MRT record, 256 MiB relationship file), skip-on-error |
- Run as an unprivileged user; grant only the capabilities the tool needs (
CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICEonly if the passive BGP listener uses port 179). - Bind the management and API listeners to localhost or a management network, and set
api.token_envwhen the API is reachable by others. - Restrict the BMP and BGP ports to your routers with a firewall; the passive BGP session has no TCP-MD5.
- Keep secrets in environment variables or your secret manager, never in the config file or in version control.