Notary runs close to network infrastructure, so we take security reports seriously and appreciate responsible disclosure.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| Latest release | Yes |
main branch |
Yes (best effort) |
| Older releases | No, please upgrade |
Do not open a public issue, discussion or pull request for security problems.
Report privately through GitHub Security Advisories:
- Go to https://github.com/LLCForge/Notary/security/advisories/new.
- Describe the issue, affected version or commit, and steps to reproduce.
- Include a proof of concept if you have one. Strip any real customer data, IP addresses or credentials from captures and logs.
What to expect:
- Acknowledgement within 3 business days.
- An initial assessment and severity rating within 10 business days.
- A fix or mitigation plan, coordinated disclosure date, and credit in the advisory (unless you prefer to stay anonymous).
- Incorrect validation results (a route reported
Validthat RFC 6811 says isInvalid, or a wrong ASPA verdict). - Remote crash or memory exhaustion through crafted RTR PDUs (including ASPA), JSON exports, SLURM files, or responses from RIPEstat, Pathology, bgp.tools, the RIPE DB or whois servers.
- TLS certificate or SSH host key verification bypass on
tls:///ssh://RTR transports. - Query API exposure beyond its read-only contract: bearer-token bypass on
/v1/*, the batch endpoint, history or ASPA queries, or the admin routes (/v1/silences,POST /v1/reload). - Script injection or data exfiltration through the embedded web UI.
- Secrets (tokens, passwords, SSH passphrases, webhook URLs) leaking into logs, metrics or API responses.
- Dependency vulnerabilities that are reachable from Notary's code paths.
- Vulnerabilities in third-party services or protocols themselves (report those upstream).
- Issues that require an attacker to already control the host or the config file.
- Denial of service by volumetric flooding of the network the tool runs on.
- Run as an unprivileged user; grant only the capabilities the tool needs.
- Bind management and API listeners to localhost or a management network.
- Keep secrets in environment variables or your secret manager, never in the config file or in version control.
- Use
tls://orssh://for RTR across any network you do not fully control; plain TCP RTR is unauthenticated. Always setssh_host_keyfrom a fingerprint you verified out of band. - Set
[api] token_envwhen the API is reachable by anyone but you. The API has no per-connection header timeout; put a reverse proxy in front if it must face untrusted clients. - Set separate, long (>= 16 bytes) tokens for
[silences] api_token_envand[health] admin_token_env; they allow muting alerts and reloading the configuration. - The data directory holds the alert queue (alert contents), silences and VRP history; keep it readable only by the service account (the shipped systemd unit, Windows installer and container already do).
| Surface | Mitigation |
|---|---|
POST /v1/validity batch |
4 MiB body cap, max_batch routes (default 10000), per-entry errors, optional bearer token |
/v1/history, /v1/aspa |
Bounded parameters (prefix 64 bytes, path 4096 bytes, limit <= 1000), file reads off the async runtime, optional bearer token |
Web UI (/, /ui/*) |
Static files compiled into the binary, CSP script-src 'self', no inline script, textContent only, frame-ancestors 'none' |
| RTR over TLS / SSH | rustls with verified server certificates; SSH host key pinned, RSA disabled (RUSTSEC-2023-0071), credentials from env |
| RTR v2 ASPA PDUs | Strict length and provider-list validation, 64 KiB PDU cap |
| Outbound calls (Pathology, bgp.tools, RIPE DB, whois) | Fixed hosts or configured URLs only, response size caps, timeouts, never on the alert path |