Herald runs close to network infrastructure, so we take security reports seriously and appreciate responsible disclosure.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| Latest release | Yes |
main branch |
Yes (best effort) |
| Older releases | No, please upgrade |
Do not open a public issue, discussion or pull request for security problems.
Report privately through GitHub Security Advisories:
- Go to https://github.com/LLCForge/Herald/security/advisories/new.
- Describe the issue, affected version or commit, and steps to reproduce.
- Include a proof of concept if you have one. Strip any real customer data, IP addresses or credentials from captures and logs.
What to expect:
- Acknowledgement within 3 business days.
- An initial assessment and severity rating within 10 business days.
- A fix or mitigation plan, coordinated disclosure date, and credit in the advisory (unless you prefer to stay anonymous).
- Injection into alert messages (Telegram HTML, Slack/Discord/Teams markup, webhook JSON, e-mail, syslog) via crafted certificate fields.
- Missed alerts caused by parser errors on valid certificates or tiles (silent detection gaps).
- Bypasses of tree head verification: forged checkpoints or STHs, consistency proofs or tiles that Herald accepts although they do not match the signed root.
- The management listener: unauthenticated access to
/v1/silencesorPOST /v1/reload, request smuggling, or resource exhaustion through/metrics,/healthz,/readyz. - Telegram action buttons: presses accepted from a user or chat that is not configured, forged callback data, or actions with a larger effect than documented (verdict, one bounded silence, one alert).
- DNS (CAA) answer parsing, CRL parsing and crt.sh parsing: crashes, unbounded memory or CPU use.
- Leakage of any secret (bot tokens, webhook HMAC secrets, SMTP passwords, routing keys, admin tokens) in logs, errors or alerts.
- Dependency vulnerabilities that are reachable from Herald's code paths.
- Vulnerabilities in third-party services or protocols themselves (report those upstream).
- Issues that require an attacker to already control the host or the config file.
- Denial of service by volumetric flooding of the network the tool runs on.
- Run as an unprivileged user; Herald needs no capabilities (the systemd unit uses
DynamicUser=yesand an empty capability set). - Bind the management listener (
[metrics] listen) to localhost or a management network. Mount/v1/silencesand/v1/reloadonly with a strong*_envadmin token. - Use a dedicated bot for
[telegram_actions], a private chat or group, and list only the people who should triage certificates inallowed_user_ids. - Prefer DNS-over-HTTPS or a resolver you trust for CAA lookups: a spoofed answer can mute or raise CAA alerts.
- Set
hmac_secret_envon webhook sinks and verify signatures on the receiving side. - Keep secrets in environment variables or your secret manager, never in the config file or in version control.