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Security: LLCForge/Herald

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Herald runs close to network infrastructure, so we take security reports seriously and appreciate responsible disclosure.

Supported versions

Version Supported
Latest release Yes
main branch Yes (best effort)
Older releases No, please upgrade

Reporting a vulnerability

Do not open a public issue, discussion or pull request for security problems.

Report privately through GitHub Security Advisories:

  1. Go to https://github.com/LLCForge/Herald/security/advisories/new.
  2. Describe the issue, affected version or commit, and steps to reproduce.
  3. Include a proof of concept if you have one. Strip any real customer data, IP addresses or credentials from captures and logs.

What to expect:

  • Acknowledgement within 3 business days.
  • An initial assessment and severity rating within 10 business days.
  • A fix or mitigation plan, coordinated disclosure date, and credit in the advisory (unless you prefer to stay anonymous).

In scope

  • Injection into alert messages (Telegram HTML, Slack/Discord/Teams markup, webhook JSON, e-mail, syslog) via crafted certificate fields.
  • Missed alerts caused by parser errors on valid certificates or tiles (silent detection gaps).
  • Bypasses of tree head verification: forged checkpoints or STHs, consistency proofs or tiles that Herald accepts although they do not match the signed root.
  • The management listener: unauthenticated access to /v1/silences or POST /v1/reload, request smuggling, or resource exhaustion through /metrics, /healthz, /readyz.
  • Telegram action buttons: presses accepted from a user or chat that is not configured, forged callback data, or actions with a larger effect than documented (verdict, one bounded silence, one alert).
  • DNS (CAA) answer parsing, CRL parsing and crt.sh parsing: crashes, unbounded memory or CPU use.
  • Leakage of any secret (bot tokens, webhook HMAC secrets, SMTP passwords, routing keys, admin tokens) in logs, errors or alerts.
  • Dependency vulnerabilities that are reachable from Herald's code paths.

Out of scope

  • Vulnerabilities in third-party services or protocols themselves (report those upstream).
  • Issues that require an attacker to already control the host or the config file.
  • Denial of service by volumetric flooding of the network the tool runs on.

Hardening recommendations

  • Run as an unprivileged user; Herald needs no capabilities (the systemd unit uses DynamicUser=yes and an empty capability set).
  • Bind the management listener ([metrics] listen) to localhost or a management network. Mount /v1/silences and /v1/reload only with a strong *_env admin token.
  • Use a dedicated bot for [telegram_actions], a private chat or group, and list only the people who should triage certificates in allowed_user_ids.
  • Prefer DNS-over-HTTPS or a resolver you trust for CAA lookups: a spoofed answer can mute or raise CAA alerts.
  • Set hmac_secret_env on webhook sinks and verify signatures on the receiving side.
  • Keep secrets in environment variables or your secret manager, never in the config file or in version control.

There aren't any published security advisories