diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index f6b4991..89df2d4 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ An HTTPS client for the Commodore 64 in 6502 assembly. Implements TLS 1.3 over T ## I just want to run it Grab a release — latest is -[**v0.5.0**](https://github.com/JC-000/c64-https/releases/tag/v0.5.0). +[**v0.5.1**](https://github.com/JC-000/c64-https/releases/tag/v0.5.1). It replaces every earlier release; see its release notes for what changed. Every build is prebuilt, as a `.prg` and as a bootable `.d64`. No assembler, no cc65, no Python packages, no build step. `MANIFEST.txt` in @@ -39,9 +39,12 @@ the default, a typed host is lowercased and gets the same name check, and an entry the prompt cannot take whole (over 63 / 100 characters, a character outside `a-z 0-9 . -` in the host, an empty label, a path not starting with `/`) prints `INVALID TARGET` and dials nothing. Type `_` with the left-arrow -key. `ip65-onchip` has no prompt. The packaging scripts never override the -default, so an image carries whatever the Makefile default was when it was -built — and **that default changed between v0.4.2 and v0.4.3**: +key. `ip65-onchip` has no prompt. The UCI images also keep a per-host key +store on the Ultimate — see ["What this client does NOT +authenticate"](#what-this-client-does-not-authenticate) for where. The +packaging scripts never override the default, so an image carries whatever +the Makefile default was when it was built — +and **that default changed between v0.4.2 and v0.4.3**: - **v0.4.2's images, and every release before it, carry `www.foo.bar`.** `.bar` is a delegated gTLD, so that is a name a third party can register. It @@ -192,6 +195,29 @@ otherwise, and nothing here said it before: image stops connecting the day the server rotates its key (some do on every renewal: `tools/spki_pin.py --check-baseline`). On `ip65-onchip` a pin is the only certificate check there is. Issue #155. +- **The released UCI images remember keys on first use, in `/USB1`.** + `uci-onchip` and `uci-comb` are built `TRUST_STORE=1`: the first time you + fetch a host they record its leaf-key hash in `TRUST.A` / `TRUST.B` in + `/USB1` on the Ultimate, and later fetches refuse a changed key unless you + accept it. That is trust on first use, not authentication, and a released + image carries no build-time pin or signed bundle (`TRUST.P`) — those need + your own build. If the store cannot be read — for instance there is no + `/USB1` volume (check the Ultimate's file browser for the name your + storage actually has) — the image prints `TRUST FAIL nn` (`02` = the path + or medium does not exist) and `CONTINUE UNPINNED? Y/N`. `Y` runs that one + fetch with **no key check** and a `** UNPINNED: KEY NOT CHECKED **` + banner, and records nothing; anything else prints `NOT DIALLED` and does + not connect. A fetch that ends in `TRUST SAVE FAIL nn` (e.g. a read-only + `/USB1`, `0D`) or `TRUST STORE FULL` (32 hosts, no eviction) recorded + nothing: a new host stays unpinned (no UNPINNED banner), and an accepted + key change is not saved, so the old key still applies. To keep the + store elsewhere, build with the product's own arguments from + `tools/package/_common.sh` plus `TRUST_STORE_DIR=`, e.g. `make BACKEND=uci + USE_NISTCURVES_ONCHIP=1 TRUST_STORE=1 TRUST_STORE_DIR=/SD` for + `uci-onchip`, or `make BACKEND=uci USE_NISTCURVES_ONCHIP_COMB=1 + TRUST_STORE=1 TRUST_STORE_DIR=/SD` for `uci-comb`. The directory must + already exist (the client never creates one) and be an absolute path of + `A-Za-z0-9_.-` components, at most 41 characters. What the client *does* prove is that the peer holds the private key for the leaf certificate it presented (the CertificateVerify signature is genuinely